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NO. 6253 
In the Supreme Court, State of Utah 
joHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT TAY-
LOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquida-
tion of the Bank of Heber City, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
j. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
V'S. 
VERNOR E. BAJRD and MARY A. BAIRD, 
His Wife,]. RuLoN MoRGAN, ]. RuLON 
MoRGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the 
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partner-
ship, ELIZABETH j. BAIRD, BANK OF 
HEBER CITY, RuLON F. STARLEY, State 
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah, 
and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner 
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and 
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F. 
SMITH and JosiE BAJRD GILES SMITH, 
His Wife, and j. HAROLD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
}. RuLON MoRGAN, 
Cross-Complainant, 
vs. 
RuLON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. 
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the 
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City, 
Cross-Defendants. 
12·66 Civil 
1410 Civil 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal From Fourth District, Wasatch County. 
Honorable Dallas H. Young, Judge. 
CHENEY, jENSEN, MARR & WILKINS, GEORGE B. STANLEY, 
PAUL B. CANNON AND DELBERT M. DRAPER, 
Attorne:ys for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
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Bank Commissioner of the State o.f Utah, 
and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner 
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and 
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F. 
SMITH and JosiE BAIRD GILES SMITH, 
His Wife, and J. ·HAROLD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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C ross-C·o·mplainant, 
vs. 
RULON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. 
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the 
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City, 
Cross--Defendants. 
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On the day previous to the oral argument in this case 
Appellants served Respondents with a typewritten Reply 
Brief. Because ·of two new points raised in the Reply 
Brief which had not be-en mentioned in the original B~rief 
of Appellants, Respondents ~asked and were granted 
leave to file this Supplemental Brief to deal with such 
new matters. Respondents have not yet been served with 
the printed Reply Brief but are as:suming that it will be 
substantially in accordance with the typewritten Brief 
heretofore served. 
The first new point raised by Appellants is, assum-
ing the AppeHants are sustained by this Court in their 
contenti·O'l1 against the Bank of Heber ~City and its suc-
cessor in interest and .the ease reversed as to this matter 
but not as to the remainder of the case, such reversal 
cannot benefit the Respondents, A. C. Moulton and E. 
D·ewey M·oulton, Plaintiffs in Case No. 1410 ~Civil, who 
are opposed to the bank, but who did not appeal. The 
Trial 1Court held that the claim of the Bank of Heber ;City 
is superior as to the water stock; that the cl,aim of A. C. 
l\f·oulton 'and E. Dewey Moulton is superior to all o~tber 
parties both as to the "\vater stock and to the real 
property. 
'Several Utah cases are cited by Appellants. The 
only two ''Thich appear analogous to the present situation 
)are Lowe & Company v. Leary, 49 Utah 506, 164 Pac.. 
105·2 ~and H'ansen v. Daniels, 73 Uta·h 142, 272 Pa.c. 941. 
These cases -vve believe a:re clearly. distinguis,hable. In 
the first case there were a nurnber of claimants whose 
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rights t·o a lien ·against a fund "'t.)re denied, the Court 
holding that the fund should be administered by a truste~ 
in bankruptcy. Only part of the claimants a:pp.ea.led. 
None of the .other claimants "\vere parties to the appe~al 
either as appellants or respondents. 1'his Court :made 
the f-ollo,ving statement in regard to the rights of non-
appealing parties : 
'"\\Thile it is true that there were ather claim-
ants, yet when the District Court rendered a de-
cision adversely to their claims, that is, when the 
said court decided that t'he claim of the trustee 
in bankruptcy was superior to their claims, then, 
instead of appealing to this .court ~as the plaintiffs 
have done, those ·Claimants acquiesced in the de-
cision of the District c.o-urt. All ,of those claim-
ants thus have adopted the decision of the District 
Court as the lavY of the cas.e, and hence have 
\vaived their rights to pa.rticipa te in the fund left 
in the hands of the school district. We can only 
help those who have attempted .to help themselves. 
N·or is the trustee in bankruptcy in a position to 
help those claimants out of the dilemma in which 
they hav-e pl.aJc.ed themselves by acquiescing in the 
decision of the District Court. 1So far as they 
are concerned, therefore, tha;t court's de~cision is 
the lattv of this case." 
The clear distinction between that case and ·the ca.se 
before the court is that the District Court has found and 
adjudi.c.a ted that the rights .of A. rC. Moulton a·nd E. 
Dewey Moulton in and to the water stock and all real 
property are superior to the rights of Appellants. See 
Findings of Fact num·bered 12 and 13 (Ab. 86 and 87), 
Conclusions .of La'v numbered 4, 5, and 6 (Ab. 98 and 9-9') 
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4 
and :nara.graphs 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the D·ecree (A b. 105-
106.-l97-108). Unless these por~tions of the Findings, 
C:onclusions and Decree are revers-ed they must, accord-
ing to the rule laid down in the Lowe case, remain as the 
law. of the case. In the Lo-we case the non-appealing 
parties had been. given no rights by the Trial O'ourt. 
Here the Moultons have been given eomplete priority 
over: Appellants by the Trial ·C·ourt. Unless this is 
reversed no~ legal manipulation -can possibly put anyone 
but tihe bank ahead of the Moultons. 
In the ease of H'arnsen v. Da.niels, eited by Appellants, 
the rr:nal C-ourt had held that the non -appealing parties 
had no lien upon the property. In the case a·t bar a lien 
has been established. 
It is noticeable that Counsel for .. A .. ppellants has not 
referred to the ;case of Garrison v. Da.vis, 88 Utah 35B, 
14 Pac. ( 2d) 439·, wh.erein it is held, Elias Hansen speak-
ing for the Court, that cer~tain non-appealing parties 
could hav.e the 'advantage of a reversal upon appeal. 
\ 
That ·Case, it seems to us, must necessarily be considered 
by the Court on this point. It was there held that vvhere 
parties ·were owners in common of certain water, an a p-
peal by one of those parties inured to the benefit of all. 
If ·where .the parties a:re ow·ners in common, such benefit 
results, a .benefit n1ust necessarily result where the non-
appealing party not only has a common interest in the 
pr;operty but has an interest adjudicated to be superior 
to that of the appealing p~rty. :s:ee also the case of 
Buskirk v. Musick (W. Va. 19:25), 130 S. E. 435. 
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5 
While 've believe that the .case before the Court is 
cle~1rly distinguishable from the eases of Lotve v. Leary 
and Hansell r. Daniels "~e believe that there are 1nany 
courts "~hich haYe held contrary to the Lowe ease and 
that upon proper oonsideration this Court should over-
rule it, if ~t has not already been overruled by Ga,rrison 
r. D·avis. See Walker's Executors v. Page, 21 Grat. 63-6, 
62 Vir. 636, and many ca.ses cited in the dissenting opin-
ion to the case of Ottunuva Boiler Works v. M. J. 0'-
Meara & Sou, 224 N. W. 803. 
Another point raised in t'he Reply BTief vvhich was 
not presented in the original Brief of Appellants is the 
reliane-e upon Sections 38-0-4, 38-0-10 and 38-0-13, Revis,ed 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, for H homestead. It is claimed, 
apparently, tha.t because the wife did not sign the pledge 
of the stock there -could be no loss of homestead and. this 
even though the ~us band is found to have been her agent 
duly authorized to pledge the stock. This on its face 
is falacious for the reason that the a.et of an agent is the 
ac.t of the piincipal. 
However, we wish to point out that if Josie Baird 
Giles S1nith still ·held any interest in the stock after i•ts 
pledge to the bank she sold that inter~est to Vern•OT Baird 
in ().ctober, 1g.2·9 and thereafter held only alien upon sueh 
stock by reason of 'a mor-tgage back from Vernor. There 
is no povision that a h·omestead right -exists in a lien. 
Hhl~ was not thereafter using the water stock upon land 
owned by her as required by !Section 38-0-4, Revised 
~tntutes of Utah., 1933. The quota~tion of that ·section 
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in the type\vritten Reply Brief of Appellants, omits the 
w·ords ''in supplying W'ater to the homestead''. The 
statemen't that she was using the water on her land after 
192'9 is contrary to the fact. The record shows that 
Vern or took a deed in 1'929 and had possession to the 
end of 1934. It was deeded to Elizabet·h Baird in J,anu-
ary, 1935. The homestead in the water stock was there-
£o·re lost for three reasons. She pledged the stock by 
a duly authorized agent in May, 19·29. ;S:he thereafter 
lost her interest by sale to Vernor. Thirdly she has no 
homeste,ad in t·he water for the reason that it has not 
been used by her ·on her property sinc.e 1929. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHENEY, JENSEN, MARR & WILKINS, 
GEORGE B. STANLEY, 
PAUL B. CANNON, 
DELBERT M. D·RAPER, 
Attor111eys for P"lain.tiff s 
arnd Respondents. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
joHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, and HERBERT TAYLOR, as Exam-
iner in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of 
Heber City, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
]. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON, 
Plaintiffs and Re~.pondents. 
vs. 
VERN OR E. BAIRD and MARY A~. BAIRD, his wife, 
]. RuLON ·MoRGAN, ]. RuLoN ·MORGAN, as 
the Surviving Partner of the Firm of ,Morgan & 
Morgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABETH ]. BAIRD, 
BANK oF HEBER CITY, RuLoN F. STARLEY, 
State Bank 'Commissioner of the State of Utah, and 
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of 
1266 
Civil 
the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City, 141 0 
ARTHUR DuKE and EuLEAN DuKE, his wife, 
RAY F. SMITH and JosiE BAIRD GILES SMITH, Civil 
his wife, and ]. HAROLD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
]. RuLoN MoRGAN, 
Cross-Complainant, 
vs. 
RULON F. STARLEY, as Bank ·Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as 
Examiner in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, 
Cross-Defendants. 
Petition For Re-Hearing 
• \ 11 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
No. 6253 
joHN A. MALIA, State Bank ·commissioner of the 
State of Utah, and HERBERT TAYLOR, as Exam-
iner in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of 
Heber City, 
Plaintiffs and · Responden·ls, 
vs. 
]. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON, 
Plaintiffs ··and Responden·ts. 
vs. 
VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD, his wife, 
]. RuLON MoRGAN, ]. RuLoN MoRGAN, as 
the Surviving Partner of the Firm of Morgan & 
Morgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABETH ]. BAIRD, 
BANK OF HEBER CITY, RuLoN F. STARLEY, 
State Bank ~Commissioner ofthe State of Utah, and 
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of 
1266 
Civil 
the Liquidation of the B·ank of Heber City, 141 0 
ARTHUR DuKE and EULEAN DuKE, his wife, 
RAY F. SMITH and JOSIE BAIRD GILES SMITH, Civil 
his wife, and J. HAROLD GILES, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
]. RuLoN MoRGAN, 
. Cross~C omplainant,. 
·vs. 
RuLON F. STARLEY, as Bank 1Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as 
Examiner in ·Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, 
Cross-Defendants. 
Petition For Re-Hearing 
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Come now Rulon F. ,Starley, as Bank :C:ommissioner 
of the ,State of Utah, and Spencer ~c. Taylor, as Examiner 
in 'Charge of the Liquidation of the B·ank of Heher City, 
respondents in case No. 1'26.6 ~Civil, and A. C. Moulton 
and E. Dewey Moulton, respondents in case No. 1410 
Civil, and respectfully petition this Honorable 1Court to 
grant a re-hearing in the above entitled cause. 
The S'pecific reasons for requesting a re-hearing in 
,case No. 126:6 Civil are the following: 
I. 
·T.he ·Court errs in the ·conclusion and statement that 
the signature of the owner must be indorsed upon the 
ple-dg~d certificates, or written authority of the agent 
must accompany the certificates. 
In its ·Opinion, this ··court holds that an agency may 
be established by conduct of the parties; that Harold 
Giles was the .agent of Josie Baird Giles, but that he 
could not· transfer her stock certificates without her in-
dorsement of the certificates or written power of attorney 
to him, authorizing indorsement. This b~r to transfer 
is s:aid to rest on Section 18-3-1, R. S. U. 193'3, and upon 
the .alleged fact that, ''there is no ·evidence in the case 
that would justify the belief that Mr. Giles was a~ 
thorized to sign his wife's name to any instrument." 
We respectfully s·ubmi t that .Section 18-3-1, supra, 
is not a bar, and that the re.cord is full of evidence that 
justifies the belief that Mr. ffiles was authorized to 
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3 
borro"l" money for the business of himself and wife and 
to pledge their business property therefor. 
Section 18-3-1, supra, must he read in conjunction 
·with the ""'hole of Chapter 3,_-of 'vhich it is a p-art. Perusal 
of the "Thole chapter disclos~s : 
18-3-4. "Possession of ·Certificate Gives P'referred 
Right.'' 
18-3-7. (4) The possession of the certificat~ ma.y 
be reclaimed and the tr.ansfer thereof recinded, unless-
( a) The certinca te has been transferred to a purchaser 
for value in good faith without notice of any facts mak-
ing th~ transfer wrongful; or (h) The injured person has 
e~ected to waive the inj-ury, or has been guilty of laches 
in endeavoring to enforce his rights. 
18-3-9. If the own_er delivers the certificate without 
indorsement, with intent to transfer, he has o·bligation to 
indorse. 
'' Beicause the statute says, 'signed by the 
owner' it is claimed that no -one other than the 
actual and lawful owner of the :certincate could 
legally or rightfully -confer title to another, and, 
as Thomas ·Wright, Jr., when he indorsed and 
transferred the certificate to the plaintiff, was not 
the real owner of the certiflca te, the plaintiff ac-
quired no right therein. ;S-o construing the stat-
ute, a bona. fide plrr·chaser for value can acquire 
title only from the real or actual owner or his 
duly authorized agent. tSuch a construction 
renders the principle of caveat emptor to its full 
extent applicable to all sales and deliveries of 
stock -certificates, the same a.s it is applicable to 
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4 
chattels. * * * Under the facts as found the 
appellant is estopped from disputing the owner-
ship of the certificate in Thomas Wright, Jr. * 
* * Lastly, it is also urged that th~ plaintiff 
was not a ·bona fide purchaser, and was put upon 
inquiry as to the validity of Thomas Wright's title 
and given notice of some infirmity or defe-ct in his 
title ~because the plaintiff did not have a transfer 
mad·e on the books of the company. * * * 
That may have been a suspi~cious circumstance of 
more or less weight, but, when considered in con-
nection with the whole of the transaction, is not 
in itself of such controlling force as to overthrow 
the finding- of bona fides, or to justify a contrary 
finding.'' :Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, 61 P.ac. 
448. 
''The finding of the court is tha:t neither of 
the banks who loaned money upon the ·certifi·cate 
had any notice so far as Argyle vvas eoncernAd. 
In view of that, therefore, the equities of the 
plaintiff are superior to those. of the appellant.'' 
Garfield B~anking Co. v. Argyle, et al., ·64 Utah 
572, 23'2. Pac. 541. · 
The law a.s above stated must be applied to the fol-
lowing facts : 
1. Harold ~Giles was the agent, and it may be held 
without undue stretching of the facts, the partner of ·Josie 
Baird ·Giles with full power to handle all property and 
business of Josie Baird ·Giles, which indisputably was 
their joint ·business, and to do all things necessary and 
desirable to the conduct of that business. Borrowing 
money on security was the regular practice of Harold 
Giles from the day he married Josie B.aird in 1924 to 
the time of their divorce in 19B4. (ISee Plaintiff's Exhibit 
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13.) The lower court held that "they operated and man-
aged their business affairs without distinction as to 
ownership thereof.'' (A b. 95) This court in its opinion 
held that Josie Baird Giles indorsed one of the certifi-
cates and that J. Harold 'Giles signed the name of Josie 
Baird Giles to the other. This ~court further held in its 
opinion that all of the pr~pe-rty 'vas owned ;by her, and 
that all of the notes were signed ·by him. For five years 
previous to the pledge, he had 'been borrowing money for 
their joint business upon her property from the Bank of 
Heber City. We submit that the ~hank under such cir-
cumstances ~and findings is a bona fid~ holder for value.· 
2. Josie :Baird Giles (Smith) testified that ·she first 
learned of the pledge in 1933. At no place in her testi-
mony or in her pleadings did she recind the action of her 
husband in pledging the stock. She made no demand for 
it from the Bank or its liquidators. 1Sh·e at no place 
repudiated the action of her hushand in pledging the 
stock. tS.he ratified all of his actions and ma.ny times 
testified that he was handling all of the '·' busin·ess.'' 
What he did was satisfactory to her. 
The eourt errs in the ·conclusion and statement that 
there is no evidence to show that .J.osie Baird 1Giles knew, 
or should have known, of the pledge. 
Attention is ·c:alled to Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. This is 
a promissory note made on the day Josie sold her home 
in Reher ;Qity (.Nb. 133; Tr. 96-9t7). A careful com-
parison ·Of the signatures of Josie Baird ~Giles and the 
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6 
writing on the note show that the note was made out by 
her and all of th~ endorsements on the back are in her 
handwriting. ·Notice the '"B'' in the word "'Bank" and 
her signatures. 
The notations on the back of the note show a com-
plete ·knowledge of Harold's dealings on the part of 
Josie. "·$1·505.3'5 B~ank - 7th Oct.'' This corresponds 
with the re.cords in the B·ank. {Ab. 1'54; Tr. 200) ""$153.00 
to mother~'' This· corresponds with the P·ecree of Dis-
tribution in the Estate of James R. Baird wherein Josie 
gav~ her mother a not~ for $153,.'33 t~ halanee the estate 
affairs. (Plaintiff's E·xhibit 8) Then follow several items 
showing payments to various individuals, sundries, shoes, 
insurance, lights and ·wiring. All of this .bookkeeping 
was carefully kept by Josie herself and not by Harold. 
Further, J:osie in her testimony showed that the husband 
and'wife worked together in this deal when she testified 
that "We used th~ money to pay bills at the Heber ~City 
Bank, but I don't know exactly the amount we paid to 
the bank.'' (A b. 133; Tr. 97) ·The money represented by 
this note "\vas used to pay Josie's de'bts as well as those 
of Harold ;Giles at th~ hank. Josie kept aceount of the 
money paid to the ~bank on the note se-cured by the pledged 
stock owned by Josie. It . would take a long stretch of 
the imagination to ~eonclude from the foregoing that a 
care:ful bookkeeper ·such as Josie was, requiring such ac-
count.ings from the _.hushand as she required, knew nothing 
of the pledge of the water stock to the bank in the midst 
of 'an of the dealings in which the stock was involved. 
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\v ... hy did she take a note from her hushand, Harold Giles 1 
The note was to pay her bills as well as his. Nothing is 
in the record to sho" .. · The only logical supposition was 
that Josie might be protected for the return of the 
pledged "\Vater stock after its release by the bank. 
We sub~it that Case N-o. 1266 is in no way related 
to Case No. 1410 except for the purpose. of trial. The law 
followed by the lower e.ourt was the same a.s that fol-
lowed by the court on appeal. The lower court having 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and judged their 
demeanor in open court should be followed in its findings 
and the judgment of the lower ~court sustained on the 
appeal, in JCase No. 1266 Civil. 
* * * * * * 
The specific reason for requesting a· re-hearing in 
case No. 1410 Civil is the· following: 
The court erred in finding that George B. :Staniey 
represented .. conflicting interests. 
To support this -contention, the following argument 
is made: 
In order to represent conflicting interests in this 
matter, ·George B. Stanley must be the attorney for Josie 
~~aird Giles ('Smith); or 
Vernor E. B·aird must have .had a property interest 
in the note, mortgage and water stock attached in the 
relationship of c-reditor; or 
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'The intere·sts of Vernor E. Baird must have been 
adverse to the interests of the Moultons. 
T,o ·consider the first proposition, this -court found 
that 'George B. ,stanley was the attorney for Vernor E. 
Baird in the preparation of the deed, note ,and mortgage~ 
It did not find that he was at all an attorney for Josie 
Baird rGiles (:Smith). The lower court found that ~George 
B .. Stanley was not in the relation of attorney and client 
to any of the parties. There is no further argument 
necessary on this point. 
In lconsidering Vernor's interest in the note, it is 
necessary to quote some of the -court's opinion. The 
court said that George B. ~Stanley '''placed his client's 
property in the hands of third parties,. to the client's 
detriment.'' The reco~d does not 'bear out this statement. 
Vernor 'E. Baird had no property interest whatever in 
the note and m-ortgage attached. The note and mortgage 
belonged to .Josie Baird ~Giles (Smith) who was not the 
client ·of George B. Stanley. There is no showing in the 
record that. 'George B .. Stanley had in his possession any 
property belongi~g to Vernor E. Baird.· 
The record does not show any conflict of interest 
between Vernor E. Baird and the Moultons. There has 
b~en ·no harm ·come to Vernor ·E. Baird because of the 
attachment of the note and ·mortgage. After the attach-
ment, he 'eonveyed all of his interest in the mortgaged 
property to his mother on January 26th, 19~3'5. At the 
time of the ·commencement of the action in 1410 Civil, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Vernor E .. Baird had no interest in the property sought 
to be foreclosed. His pleadings show that he disclaimed 
any interest therein. ('Plaintiff's Exhi·bit 1) It was stip-
ulated befor~ the trial .commenced that no deficiency 
judgment would ·be taken in the action, and this offer wa.s 
made in open court at the c-ommencement of the trial by 
the Moultons. (Tr. 4-'5) The foreclosure was necessary 
T!Q OLBT·AIN PAYMENT .OF THE D·E:BT ·DUE AND 
·OWING BY JOSIE B1AIRiD GILE;S T·O· THE M·O·U,L:-
TO·N:s. Josie still owed the dHbt when the foreclosure 
commenced ·even though J. Rulon M·organ, her a.tt~rney, 
had prepared a series of conveyances the result of which 
was intended to release her from paying her honest 
obligation. 
The court further states: ''But for the acts of M·r. 
Stanley, Vernor Baird's obligations to his ·sister would 
have been peac~ably settled.'' ·There is nothing in the 
record to show that they were not peaceably settled. The 
attachment was made July 7th, 1934. The sale which 
took place on J anua.ry 2'9th, 19·35 would have done nothing 
more than substitute the Moultons for Josie B;aird Giles 
as owners and holders of the note ·sued upon in 1410 
Civil. Settlement of the obligation between the Moultons 
and Vernor E. B:aird was impossible after January 29th, 
19,3:5 for the reason tha.t Vernor had conveyed all of his 
interest in the mortgaged property to his mother. This 
impossible situation was created ;by J. Rulon Morgan, who 
prepared the deed from Vernor' to his mother, the mort-
gage from Vern or to l\-forgan & M.organ, the release of 
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mortgage (Defendant's exhibits D, E and I) on January 
216th, 1'935. Vern or was out on the desert and William 
H. B·aird took the deed and mortga.ge out for him to sign. 
(Ab. 201; Tr. 870-371) After this; he took no interest 
in the matter, even though he signed pleadings, as is 
evidenced by the fact that the trial ~commenced on Sep-
tember 11th, 1939 (Tr. 2), and Vernor did not appear 
until'September 18th, 1'93'9. ('Tr. 357-'358) S·ever:al times 
mention is made that Vernor will later he a.t the trial, 
the most conspicuous of which is made by :Judge Han-sen, 
when spealring.of V~rnor E. Baird, he states: ''For your 
information, we hope to have him here today.'' (Tr. 282) 
This was in the latter part of the trial and the statement 
when studied carefully shows that Vernor had no interest 
in the trial, and the other defendants were hopeful that 
he might show up to testify for them. 
George B. Stanley was still representing Vernor 'E. 
Ba.ir·d -on February 4th, 1938. (Ab. 201; Tr. 371) Would 
he have an :adv·erse attorney still do work for him~ 
Respondents and their Counsel respectfully submit 
that the opinion of the ·C~:nirt is in error in the particulars 
noted, and that a re-hearing_ of this cause should be 
granied. 
PAUL B. CANNON, 
DELBERT M. DRAPER, c., It) k 
GEORGE B. STANLEY, ~~ ~ 
. Attorneys for Plaintiffj/ 
and Respondents. 
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We, th·e undersigned, Paul B. Cannon, Delbert M. 
Draper and George B. Stanley, Attorneys for plaintiffs 
and respondents in the above -entitled ;cause, hereby 
certify that in our opinion the foregoing :Petition for 
Re-hearing of said cause in this Court is meritorious and 
is well founded in fact as well as in law. Q . 
PAUL B. (lANNON, t-:w/{3.~~ 
DELBERT M. DRAPER,' ic~ ··-·· 
GEORGE B. 8TA~EY. ,61~ 
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